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Commercial Expansion and the Industrial Revolution
I
The problem to be examined is the relationship between the commercial
expansion of the 17th and 18th centuries and the industrial revolution. In
particular it may be asked whether a commercial revolution, i.e., a
discontinuously rapid increase in commerce, was necessary to, sufficient
for or merely contributed to the industrial revolution. If commercial
expansion was not needed in advance of an industrial revolution, was it
required as a concomitant? Are different types of merchants needed at different
stages of industrial evolution or revolution? In particular, at a fairly
advanced stage of industry, the mercantile function may best be taken over by
the industrial firm which undertakes direct buying and direct selling; and
continued performance of the middleman function by the merchant community
may inhibit technical change by acting as a filter between producer and
consumer, blocking communication between them.
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, the merchant has been
thought to have contributed to industrialization in various ways: by
extending the market for outputs; by increasing the range and reducing the
cost of available inputs; through capital accumulation; "to some extent"
as a source of entrepreneurial ability; by directly and indirectly increasing
purchasing power; by inducing rationality in business procedures and widening
economic horizons [Minchenton, 1969, p. 51] additional points made in other
lists, and somewhat less compelling, are the importation of foreign techniques
[Bairoch, 1973, p. 544] and serving as a cause of growth of large towns and
industrial centers [Deane, 1965, p. 68].
The method employed here is to study the role of merchants in a number
of countries which are not widely dissimilar. We first analyze the activities
of merchants in general, and then examine the ties between commerce and
industry in four countries: Holland, Britain, France and Germany. In
particular, we examine the hypothesis that the commercial revolution produced
the industrial revolution in Britain; a commercial revolution in Holland
failed to lead to an industrialization process; and industrialization occurred
in Germany based on direct selling and buying by industrial firms, without
the need for or the benefit of a flourishing commercial network; and see which
of these general views, if they are verified, applied in France. Limitations
of time and capacity prevent extending the examination to the Italian city-
states with their commercial expansion of the 16th and 17th centuries, or to
Spain engaged in colonial trade via Seville and Cadiz in the same period.
Mere mention is made of Swiss experience in textiles and watches.
Commerce may be foreign, and within foreign, continental and overseas;
or domestic, and within domestic, national, regional, or local. The term
"merchant", moreover, covers a wide spectrum of individuals engaged in various
activities which overlap, but the central focus of many differs in significant
ways. The literature mentions the great merchant or Merchant Adventurer, the
merchant banker, merchant-shipper, merchant-manufacturer, stapling merchant,
wholesaler, retailer. In French distinctions, not always identical, are made
among negociant , amateur (ship-outfitter) , marchand , detailleur , boutiquier ;
in German among Grosskaufmann , Kaufmann , HMndler ; in Holland among First Hand,
Second Hand, and Third Hand. Differences among various writers in the same
country and a fortiori between countries make precision about numbers difficult
if not impossible. In the main, we are interested in overseas trade on the one
hand, and the wholesaler at the national level on the other, and are specifically
not concerned with retail shopkeepers.
The functioning of the merchant must of course be specified in historical
time since his role has been continuously evolving. N.S.B. Gras traces this
evolution from the travelling unspecialized merchant of the late Middle Ages
who played a role especially in moving goods as well as financing, buying and
selling them, and the sedentary specialized merchant of the 17th and 18th
century who operated from his counting house, and perhaps a warehouse,
increasingly specialized by commodities, by function (export, import, shipping,
finance, insurance) and by area [Gras, 1939, passim ] . Specialization by
commodities was linked to that by function since when a sedentary merchant
was also a shipowner or outfitter, for example, he found it necessary to
provide different commodities for both outbound and return voyage, whereas
to specialize in commerce without shipping made it possible to deal with
limited numbers of products down to one. The specializing merchant, however,
was exposed to greater risk as commodity quality changed, or old markets were
closed off, leaving his knowledge obsolete and him without a continuing function.
After the 18th century, direct buying and selling reduced the roles of
merchant and merchant nation.
The mercantile function can be divided analytically into two parts which
we may represent by ideal types: the "gains-from-trade" merchant who buys
cheap and sell dear in arbitrage fashion, and the "value-added" merchant
who concerns himself especially with the quality of goods, and among particular
aspects of quality, delivery date or timeliness. The distinction of course
is overdrawn, since transport and finance in transit adds value to goods in
the arbitrage case, and gains from trade are reaped where the merchant is
deeply concerned with standardization, quality control and prompt delivery.
Moreover the merchant who brings colonial products from the Baltic, Mediterranean,
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East Indies and America to Amsterdam for stapling in "gains-from-trade"
operations generally improves the quality of the goods, refining sugar, curing
tobacco, roasting coffee, repacking grain to prevent spontaneous combustion,
breaking bulk and the like. The distinction is nonetheless a useful one and
runs between joining markets and altering markets by upgrading goods, standard-
izing them, economizing on inspection and handling. In both cases, the merchant
provides information, in the first instance on where goods exist and where
they may be needed, in the second of what kinds of goods should be produced
to satisfy consumer demand at minimal cost.
Most emphasis in the commercial revolution has been on the "gains-from-
trade" merchant who uses his information and courage to obtain large rents
when he is successful. The value-added function has perhaps been neglected.
To avoid the risk that the goods bought and financed will be rejected by the
purchasing merchant or the ultimate consumer, the merchant first inspects, say,
textiles closely, not only at the fair or in the cloth hall, but in his ware-
house, under strong light, and then undertakes to full, shear, bleach, size,
dye or otherwise finish the cloth for the market. New qualities are sought
to displace old standards and penetrate new markets.
The distinction between the gains-from-trade and the value-added merchant,
while loose, is broadly that between the First Hand in the United Provinces
of Holland which dealt, bought and sold goods from overseas, and the Second
Hand which sorted them, inspected, arranged for bleaching and dyeing when
needed and then repacked. It is not far from Adam Smith's separation between
the speculative-merchant who can sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by
two or three successful speculations, and the slow accumulator in a single
industry who seldom makes a great fortune but in consequence of a long life
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of industry, frugality and attention [Smith, 1776, pp. 113-114]. Adam Smith
claimed that the only difference between a competent retailer and a great
merchant was the quantity of capital:
"Besides possessing a little capital, he must be able to
read, write and account, and must be a tolerable judge too of,
perhaps, fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices,
qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapest.
He must have all the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for
a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming
but the want of sufficient capital." (Ibid . , p. 112)
This underrates the qualities which Smith detects in the speculative merchant:
boldness and foresight, including the boldness in the "value-added" merchant
of urging new varieties of products on producers and consumers.
When the knowledge used by the gains- from- trade merchant has been widely
diffused, his contribution is ended. Direct buying and selling replace his
intermediary role. Similarly the specialized merchant who develops a particu-
lar product for a particular market faces a crisis when a new better quality
displaces his. He may sell the old product in new markets, or more likely
a new set of merchants may take over selling the old product in new markets.
On this score, the fact that merchants in many societies seek to make a
fortune and withdraw from economic life into politics, gentle life or rural
pursuits is helpful. Capital accumulated in commerce may be invested in
land, government stock, canal, turnpike and later railroad securities, used
to build spacious houses or chateaux, and consumed, and hence to be unavailable
for industry. Some will be diverted to banking and recycled into other
commerce. But the social aspirations of most successful merchants which induce
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them to withdraw from trade serve an economic and political purpose. Where
they continue on, they block economic change and tend to perpetuate oligarchies
which may be republican but are not democratic.
II
The commercial revolution for present purposes, ignoring the Hanseatic
cities, the Italian city-states and Seville and Cadiz, began in the United
Provinces of Holland. Favored by location in the days of sailing ships,
at the crossroads of traffic between the Atlantic (and Mediterranean) and the
Baltic, and representing a "land of cities intimately united by an all-pervading
network of waterways [Marshall, 1920, p. 33], the Dutch developed colonies,
shipbuilding, shipping, herring fisheries and the stapling trade. The linkage
from trade to local production led to shipbuilding, and Dutch success in ship-
building in the 17th century gave her an advantage in fishing for herring along
the British east coast in the North Sea. Herring were also bought from
Scandinavia, and packed with salt obtained from Portugal. Baltic grain was
repacked in the stapling ports with Second Hand skill which prevented it from
exploding in the heat of the Mediterranean. Linens from Europe exchanged against
woolens from Britain were both bought and sold in Amsterdam, after having been
finished in Haarlem with local supplies of acid whey for bleaching along with
seaweed from the Mediterranean and ashes for lye obtained from many points.
The First Hand bought, financed and brought the goods to Holland, later shipped
them on to their ultimate destination. The Second Hand sorted, inspected,
finished, repacked them. The Third Hand wholesaled them to the hinterland.
All dealt in the highly developed commodity and financial markets of Holland
[Wright, 1955, pp. 1-6].
Dutch shipping is said to have embodied few innovations, but made effective
use of all existing techniques. There was specialization of design between
naval and merchant vessels, so that the latter could be more lightly built -
not having to carry cannon - and could be cheaper and more efficiently sailed.
Dutch shipbuilding, it was said, would have provided Adam Smith with a more
striking example of the division of labor than pinmaking [Haley, 1972, p. 19].
The Dutch fluyt was standardized, so that as many as one a day could be
built in the yards of Saardam, which used labor-saving machinery, especially
winddriven sawmills and great cranes to lift and move heavy timbers. Timber
was imported from the Baltic duty-free, and large inventories were maintained
- for as many as four or five thousand ships [Barbour, 1929-30, pp. 119-24].
With a crew of 10 against one of 30 for an equivalent English vessel, freight
rates in Dutch ships were one third to one half lower in peacetime than those
of any rival. Since it was always easy to find a ship bound for Amsterdam,
stapling there was often cheapest even when it was the longest way around
[ Ibid . , p. 132].
Dutch stapling stimulated other industries beside shipbuilding and
its related ropemaking, canvas, and naval supplies, and fishing, including
herring, cod and whaling. There were cheese and gin, plus the finishing of
colonial products and textiles. Haarlem, as mentioned, specialized in
bleaching, Leiden in weaving, based on imported wool from Spain, and
Amsterdam in silk. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 brought
to the Netherlands from France, Protestant immigrants estimated by Scoville
at 50-75,000. Included among them was a number of entrepreneurs who undertook
silk manufacture in Haarlem and Utrecht, as well as production of velvet
and linen in the French manner. The stimulus was short-lived, however, as
compared with that in commerce and finance, and France recaptured the
market for these products after the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 [Scoville,
1960, pp. 341-47].
Dutch successes in the 16th and 17th centuries were not limited to
commerce, exploration, shipbuilding, fishing, but extended to public
works - especially land reclamation, and not only in Holland but in England,
France, Sweden and elsewhere fC. Wilson, 1968, chapter 5] - and to agriculture.
The Dutch entrepreneur, workman, farmer, and seaman seems to have been character-
ized by energy and innovation. This industry and vitality are the only basis
that one can make sense of Adam Smith's remark that the "carrying trade is
the natural effect and symptom of great wealth, but it does not seem to be
the cause of it" [Smith, 1776, p. 354]. Or perhaps a distinction is being
made between the carrying trade - shipping - as such, and commerce with large
gains from trade. Smith recognized that Holland was the richest country of
Europe - though there is some lag here as marks of decline in the Dutch and
upsurge of the British were apparent by 1700 and clear by 1730. But in his
identification of commerce with manufactures, and merchants with artificers,
Smith does not recognize that unlike England, Holland was a country with
commerce but not manufactures.
The decline of the Dutch economy after about 1730 is variously explained.
Three wars against the British in the 17th century and two against the French
in the early 18th were surely a major factor. On narrow economic grounds,
these destroyed capital, cut trade routes, raised taxes, which were levied
on consumption and thus raised wages. In broader sociological terms, they
drained the economy of its energy and innovative capacity. Not only did trade
decline, but also shipbuilding, textile production, fishing and agriculture.
Dutch industry, sailors, innovators and capital went abroad. Many industries
expired without a fight [Wright, 1955, p. 59]. In 1670 the Dutch considered
themselves superior to the British in energy and ability as well as capital
and material resources. In 1779 a Leiden clothier complained of the general
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lack of initiative among Dutch industrialists, and a deep-rooted aversion to
experimenting with new methods... "a lack of initiative and enterprise in many
industries and to some extent in agriculture in striking contrast to 100 years
previously" [Boxer, 1970, pp. 245, 259]. Cipolla believes this decline in
capacity to meet economic challenges is typical of all empires - a three-
generations effect which applies to societies as well as to families. "The
Dutch of the seventeenth century were great innovators. By the end of the
18th century they were incapable of keeping up with progress taking place outside
their boundaries" [Cipolla, 1970, pp. 8-9].
Such sociological explanation is rejected by a recent study of the
comparative industrial growth of Belgium and the Netherlands in the first half
of the 19th century [Mokyr, 1974a, 1974b], which comes down squarely on the
explanation of high wages in Holland as the cause of failure to industrialize.
Other explanations relate to lack of mineral resources, especially coal, in-
adequate demand, and governmental policy, especially free trade, insisted on by
the First Hant as a traditional protector of their gains from stapling
[Mokyr, 1974b, chapter 6; Wright, 1955, passim ] . High wages clearly would
make it difficult for Dutch industry to compete in existing industries with
existing methods with countries with lower wages, especially if Dutch
capitalists provided capital to Dutch and foreign industry at equal rates.
But Dutch wage rates were high only in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland,
and low in Utrecht, Friesland, Overijessel, Gelderland, and Groningen.
More fundamentally, the impact of high wages is damaging to industralization
only in a static model. In a dynamic model, high wages stimulate innovation
as Habakkuk points out for the United States in the 19th century, and
Crouset for Britain in 18th [Habakkuk, 1962, passim ; Crouzet, 1966, p. 288].
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In the 16th century, the Dutch went into trade for lack of land [Gee, 1729,
p. 128, quoted by Smith, 1776, p. 96]. In the early period a dynamic model
applies; in the later, a static. The change from the dynamic to the static
model may be more significant than parametric shifts in either.
Nonetheless the Dutch experience makes clear that commercial success is
not sufficient for industrial success, and that flourishing and highly specialized
commerce poses risks while it earns large gains from trade. England set out
to challenge Dutch supremacy in trade, with the Navigation Acts and acts of
war. Hamburg represented another threat. But the Dutch emporium declined under
direct trading even without the aid of mercantile policy. Exeter serges which
had first gone via London and Holland to Spain and Portugal cut out first
London, and then Holland, after bringing the dyeing and finishing stages to
Devon [Hoskins, 1935, pp. 69-74; C. Wilson, 1941, p. 39]. German linens
ultimately skipped Haarlem on their way to British ports [C. Wilson, ibid .
,
pp. 55-56]. The proportion of Bordeaux exports which went to the United
Provinces bound for Germany and the Baltic declined from 53 percent in 1717-
21 to 21 percent in 1764-66 while that of exports direct for the "North" rose
from 10 percent to 51 percent [Crouzet, 1968, p. 256]. From having been
the "regulating granary" of Europe in grain, Holland by the 19th century
was merely a dumping ground [Wright, 1955, p. 171].
Long-distance trade by sea need have no connection with domestic industry.
It is not clear whether this is accidental: "the absence of any large export
industry which could form the solid backbone of exports and domestic invest-
ment" [C. Wilson, 1941, p. 187] or in the nature of colonial trade. A
reviewer of an eight-volume work on Bordeaux notes that "Just like Athens
in the classical period, or Carthage in the Roman epoch, or Venice in the
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XVI century or Amsterdam in the XVII, Bordeaux found itself operating, in
the XVIII century, as a center for the deposit and distribution of a flood
of goods which passed from one hemisphere (sic ) to the other left behind
by all those ports like London, Le Havre or Marseilles which were connected
to the great European industrial centers" [Olivieri, 1973, pp. 454-56],
"A merchant is not necessarily a citizen of any country" said Adam Smith.
"It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his
trade" [Smith, 1776, p. 395]. Smith's understanding of trade is not always
complete: he believed that the merchant employed in exchanging corn from
Koenigsberg for wine from Portugal brought both to Amsterdam because he felt
uneasy separated from his capital, and wanted to see it enough to compensate
for the double charge for loading and unloading [ Ibid . , pp. 421-22]. This
ignores the stapling functions of quality control through grading, packing,
storing and the like. But "merchants knew perfectly well in what manner
(commerce) enriched themselves. It was their business to know it. But to
know in what manner it enriched the country was no part of their business"
[ Ibid ., p. 403].
To the extent that the entrepreneurship thesis is valid, it differs in
Holland (and Hamburg and Marseilles) from the formulation applicable in
Britain and most of France. Dutch merchants did not withdraw their capital
to buy land and enter the nobility as the British and French sought to.
There was too little land available for the purpose [C. Wilson, 1968, p. 35;
Haley, 1972, p. 49; but for a contrary view see Geyl, 1961, p. 164], The First
Hand closed ranks, formed a tight oligarchy, resisted new entry, and moved
gradually out of trade into conspicuous consumption and banking. Moreover
it was international, not domestic banking, and like Dutch trade unconnected
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with domestic industry. Charles Wilson overstates the case when he writes
that finance became the handmaiden of the industrial revolution in England,
but in Holland the mistress of a plundered and bankrupt household [C. Wilson,
1941, p. 188]. Holland's commercial role went into sharp decline by 1750; its
financial role, despite crises such as those of 1763 and 1772, lasted until
the Napoleonic Wars. In the long run, finance remains more concentrated, and
is slower to cultivate direct relations outside the center than is commerce.
Ill
In the United Provinces, the commercial revolution was not followed
by an industrial revolution. In Britain it was. But the British were not
seeking to expand commerce as a basis for industrialization when at the end
of the 16th century and throughout the 17th they deliberately set out on
mercantilist lines to rival Dutch commerce. On the contrary, they were bent
on taking over the Dutch monopoly. The Duke of Albemarle said (later)
"What we want is what the Dutchmen have" [Williams, 1970, p. 484]. Sir Josiah
Child listed 15 respects in which the English should ape the Dutch [C . Wilson,
1965, p. 40] because with his compatriots he wanted to take over the rents
inherent in Dutch gains from trade. To the extent that the commercial revolu-
tion in Britain determined the subsequent changes in industry - "perhaps
determined" them [Mantoux, 1961, p. 92] it was accidental rather than by design.
Like its Dutch counterpart, The East India Company was established at
the end of the 16th century. In 1614 a group of London merchants tried to
escape the monopoly of textile finishing by forbidding the export of
undyed cloth [C. Wilson, 1968, p. 31]. The effort broke down by 1622.
A proclamation of 1615 urging the use of English ships found little favor
with Yarmouth, Hull or London merchants [Barbour, 1929-30, p. 114]. Half a
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century later, however, these policies began to take effect. The Navigation
Acts were adopted in 1651, strengthened in 1661, and supplemented in 1663 by
the Staple Act which monopolized the carrying trade of the colonies [Williams,
1970, p. 484]. New Amsterdam was exchanged for Surinam after the Second
Anglo-Dutch War and rechristened New York. Export restrictions were applied
in wool in ; the earliest restriction on export of machinery was that of the
stockingframe in 1698. At the same time measures of protection of British
industry were begun (and continued throughout the 18th century) in iron,
linen, sailcloth, and to keep out calico in an effort to protect woolens,
A revolution in British trade consisted in the "sudden and rapid growth
in re-export trade from negligible to one third of exports in 1699-1701"
[Davis, 1954, p. 94]. In the hundred years after 1660, "the English merchant
class was able to grow rich, to accumulate capital, on middlemen's profits
and on the growing shipping industry which was needed to carry cheap sugar
and tobacco, pepper and saltpeter on the ocean routes. Although re-exports
and these imports called for no investment in home industry, but only in trade,
this could be called the commercial revolution [ Ibid . , p. 95].
As Dutch commercial vitality in colonial products diminished, that of
Britain (and France) rose. The initial monopoly of London in the established
trading companies and under the Methuen treaty of 1703 with Portugal made the
outports restive. The West Coast ports were better located for Atlantic trade;
Bristol, Liverpool, Exeter and Glasgow moved into triangular trade with
West Africa and the West Indies and American colonies, and direct trade to
the American colonies. Glasgow specialized in Virginia and Maryland tobacco,
by 1750 outstripping London, Whitehaven, Bristol and Liverpool [Price, 1973, p.
590], and stapling it for Amsterdam and French ports by virtue not of value-
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added in sorting, packaging and the like, but on the basis of the monopoly
of British ports conferred by the Navigation Acts.
The great West-Indies merchants like John Pinney [Pares, 1950], or John
Gladstone [Checkland, 1971] were "speculative merchants", forced into sugar
plantations largely by the necessity to take over the properties of those to
whom they sold slaves on credit or advanced funds for other purposes. The
record shows little interest in improving such plantations, beyond hiring
the most efficient overseer possible. John Gladstone never visited the
Indies and John Pinney 's "great pride" was "to be considered as a private
country gentlemen" [Pares, 1950, p. 141]. Both had more money than they knew
what to do with. The Pinney merchant house speculated in cotton and sugar,
and once put fcl0,000 into the Great Western Cotton Works [ Ibid . , p. 331]. For
the most part they invested their profits and slave compensation money in
English land, government securities, and railway shares [ Ibid . , p. 319].
John Gladstone supported the industrial revolution to the extent of contri-
buting to the education of artisans and workers through the Mechanics and
Apprentices Library [Checkland, 1971, p. 176]. He toyed briefly with the
idea of buying a country bank which had suspended payments in Gloucester
in 1825 [ Ibid . , pp. 182-83], but the deal fell through. For a man without
pretensions to enter the artistocracy, there were not many investment outlets
apart from houses and estates before the railroad boom and limited liability.
"He knew little of industry, for the world of a Liverpool merchant prince was
distinct from that of a factory owner [ lb id . , p. 198].
The connection of gains-from-trade commerce with industry were limited.
To a small degree Bristol went in for staple-based industries. It had 20
sugar refineries in operation in the middle of the 18th century, glass-making
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for home demand and exports, tobacco-processing, a chocolate industry
established in 1731, and a range of metal manufacture [Minchenton, 1969,
p. 43]. But the city lost ground in the 18th century for a variety of reasons
- delays in modernizing the harbor and the lack of a hinterland caught up in
the industrial revolution [Minchenton, 1957b, p. xv] . This reverses the
causation from industry to commerce. It savors of understatement to say
"not all overseas trade had industrial consequences [Minchenton, 1969, p. 44].
Glasgow was important in colonial trade and in manufacturing, but there was
no connection between the tobacco fortunes and the cotton factories [Campbell,
1964, pp. 17-19]. Merchants became landowners [Devine, 1971, passim ] , bankers,
or plantation owners overseas, not industrialists. Minchenton is forced
to deny Eric Williams' claim that "profits from West African and West Indian
trades provided one of the main streams of accumulation of capital in England
which financed the industrial revolution [Minchenton, 1969, p. 47].
Recent research, to be sure, has concluded that the industrial revolu-
tion did not need large streams of capital from commerce apart from working
capital furnished by merchants. Fixed capital needs were small, and expansion
was financed by plowed back earnings [Crouzet, 1972, passim ] . As we shall
see presently, an exception existed for South Wales in iron and copper, but
not in tinplate or copper. For the most part, however, the industrial
revolution was not characterized by a discontinous leap in rates of savings
and capital formation, as economic historians have long thought.
At the other end of the analytical spectrum from the Merchant Adventurer
seeking large gains from train in overseas operations was the value-added
merchant who operated internally to create a national market within Britain.
Bit by bit a mercantile system evolved, starting with a single emporium or
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relay center, which like Amsterdam in the 17th century world, served as
a hub for the system while information was a scarce input and transactions
costs high, and gradually was replaced both by direct connections which
bypassed the initial pivot, and by the development of new and more efficiently
located markets in some commodities, such as Manchester for cotton, cotton
yarn, cotton gray-goods and finished cottons.
London was the initial relay, for domestic as for foreign trade. The
monopoly in foreigh trade was man-made; that in domestic was an evolutionary
construct. In 1677, London had 1686 merchants - although it is unclear what
this means in the absence of unambiguous definitions. It was the entrepot
of England, with the postal system at its inception in the 17th century
radiating out along five or more great roads from London, and with one rate
charged for a letter to or from London and double that for letters between
other parts of the country, on the theory that all letters went to, from or
through the capital [Westerf ield, 1913, pp. 417, 419].
Trade was local, national and international. In the early stages both
national and international trade went through London. International trade
separated itself first to the outports [Court, 1938, chapter ix]. The merchants
of Leeds and Wakefield finally gained full control of the Yorkshire export
trade, and routed it through Hull, rather than London, forty years after
1700 [R.G. Wilson, 1971b, p. 147]. Inland traders were less important than
exporters in the first half of the 18th century but seem to have used London
still to a considerable extent [R.G. Wilson, 1971a, p. 82]. In import-competing
goods with no export market, national marketing took place through London
merchants, whether in silk as illustrated by Sir Thomas Lombe in London, or
ribbons, manufactured in Coventry but sold through 12 merchant-manufacturers
with warehouses in London and Coventry [Prest, 1960, p. 49].
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The evolution of the process is seen in detail in cotton. In the
first half of the 18th century, London was the center for the greater part of
the sale of Manchester goods, home and foreign, and a merchant like Joseph
Hague made a fortune in London as both importer of cotton for Lancashire and
dealer in cotton goods [Wadsworth and Mann, 1931, p. 237]. The change to
Manchester took place more rapidly in cloth than in raw cotton, where London
remained the main port until 1795 - a decade after the industry had begun
exporting cloth. London lost out in cloth slowly after 1780, and rapidly
from 1790 when Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow merchants took over. Ultimately
Glasgow cloth was marketed through Manchester [Edwards, 1967, pp. 107, 151, 171,
176]. At the end, only surplus stock was sent to London [ Ibid . , p. 181]. In
the 19th century there began the movement of some manufacturers into the
merchant function - buying cotton in Egypt and the United States, and dispatching
cloth to commission agents at home and abroad [C. Wilson, 1955, p. 180]. The
industry was one, however, in which the merchant system remained powerful
and prevented wide development of direct selling. Woolens moved to direct
trading [Allen, 1939, p. 260]. In cotton textiles, failure to eliminate the
merchant led to an unnecessarily large number of separate qualities of product
since the merchant lacked motive to induce the customer to change specifications,
however arbitrary, and could transfer orders from one manufacturer to another
until he found one who would fill them [Robson, 1957, pp. 92-95]. Like
Amsterdam or London as a trading relay, the merchant is efficient at a certain
stage of economic development, and dysfunctional beyond it. In the functional
stage, it is important to have trade develop with the scale of industry.
Thereafter it helps to have the merchant ready to withdraw. The speculative
merchant finds no difficulty in withdrawing provided that he is attracted
18.
into the high-prestige vocations of banking, or public service, or the high-
prestige avocation of country life.
Between the pure types of gains-from-trade and value-added merchants
broadly represented by the tobacco importer of Glasgow and the cotton-yarn
specialist of Manchester lay a wide number who combined both functions.
Perhaps the woolen trades provide the best illustration. In the 17th century
Exeter was the scene of a flourishing export trade in woolens woven in
Devon. The dependence of the weaver on the merchant is illustrated in
Tiverton's action when a merchant died in 1765 in sending to Exeter for another
[Mantoux, 1961, p. 65]. Exeter first shipped its serges to London which relayed
them to Amsterdam for finishing and distribution on the Continent. London
took the finishing away from Amsterdam. Then Exeter shipped direct to
Amsterdam. Later Exeter took over the finishing from London and Amsterdam
and shipped direct to Hamburg, Oporto, Cadiz [Hoskins, 1935, chapters 2,3].
While these changes were occurring, however, Norwich came up in worsteds and
Devon serges began to decline. As early as 1714 Sir John Elwill, a leading
Exeter merchant, writing to a Dutch client, noted that "mixt serges (were) not
worn by Many Sort of people as formerly." In comment, Charles Wilson suggests
that it is not altogether fanciful to seek part of the explanation for failure
in the relative weakness of the link between manufacturer and merchant. In
Devonshire the two functions were often separate; in Norwich and Yorkshire
they were often combined." [C. Wilson, 1955, p. 177]. After a brief glory,
Professor Wilson notes, Norwich which had benefited from London merchants
gave way to Yorkshire where the link was most strong (Bowring put the point
more generally in 1872: Exeter's decay he attributed to want of men of
sufficient means and wide views to create new branches of trade when the old
had gone [Hoskins, 1935, p. 53].).
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To a considerable extent, however, the Yorkshire experience has been
misinterpreted. A great deal of the difficulty has been caused by Herbert
Heaton's attention to Benjamin Gott, a merchant who went into manufacturing
and built Bean Ing, a vast mill in which all the processes from sorting the
wool to packing the finished pieces were carried on under one roof. By
1800 the mill housed a thousand operatives. Heaton called Gott only
an Industrial Half-Revolutionary because all his weavers worked handlooms
and he supplemented their output by purchasing heavily from small domestic
clothiers [Heaton, 1965, p. xix] (Compare Gras, who called Sir Thomas Lombe,
a London merchant who financed a silk throwing mill on the Italian pattern
on the Derwent river in 1718 as the morning star of the industrial revolu-
tion, not the rising sun [Gras, 1939, p. 178] because it used waterpower
instead of steam.). There were others beside Gott who went from merchanting
into manufacture, the Luptons [Heaton, 1965, p. xx] , John Edwards and Law
Atkinson [R.G. Wilson, 1971a, p. 60]. The outcry which this change of
profession gave rise to has given a misleading impression. With very few
exceptions, merchants did not enter manufacturing. When successful, they put
their fortunes into land, annuities, government stock, canals and turnpikes,
entered public life or retired to the country. Some like William Denison
invested in land but did not retire to the country; he was interested in
land for its safe return [R.G. Wilson, 1971b, p. 151]. But the gentlemen
merchants of Leeds provided neither capital nor entrepreneurship for the
industrial revolution.
They did, however, extend the market, and this by upgrading quality
and pushing on delivery dates. Yorkshire's share of British exports of
woolens rose from one-fifth in 1700 to one-third in 1772 and three-fifths
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in 1800. It was accomplished, states R.G. Wilson, by concentrating on
the cheap end of the market in both woolens and worsteds and leaving to
East Anglia (Norwich) the better worsteds, to the West Country (Cotswolds)
the fine broadcloths, and to Devon (Exeter) the serges [ Ibid . , pp. 6-7].
Cloth was bought in cloth halls, or purchased direct from the clothiers, but
in any event was brought to the merchant's workshop after purchase and inspected
[ Ibid . , pp. 56, 75]. No one paid attention to the lead seal testifying to
measurements. It was sheared, fulled, dyed and sized by the merchant in his
workshop, or on order under his direction. Price was not an issue in exports
as compared with quality. "William Denison bullied his clothiers about delays
and inferior workmanship and occasionally threatened withdrawal of his customs,
but never attempted to dictate prices" [ Ibid . , p. 57], Initially Yorkshire
woolens were relayed by way of London, then Amsterdam, then sold direct to
Europe. In due course the European market died down and expansion shifted to
trans-Atlantic trade with the American colonies, and after interruption from
1770 to 1783 with the United States. As each major shift came in the trade,
new merchant houses came to the fore and old either failed or withdrew. The
shift from the German and Portugese trade to America, for example, meant
new risks, especially much longer extensions of credit and new names.
Extension of the market underlined by Adam Smith was far from unimportant,
but it tended to move parallel to rather than in anticipation of increases
in production. Davis claims that the process of industrialization in
England from the second quarter of the 18th century relied importantly on
colonial demands for "nails, axes, firearms, buckles, coaches, clocks,
saddles, handkerchiefs, buttons, cordage and a thousand other things,
'goods, several sorts'" [Davis, 1969, p. 106]. In nails, the nailmonger
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stood between nail-maker and export-merchant, serving especially the colonial
trade, grew rich and turned banker [Court, 1938, pp. 199-206]. This did
not involve financing industry directly, but rather more trade.
The major systematic provision of entrepreneurship and finance from
commerce to industry is found in the iron and copper industry of South Wales.
Here the industry was organized from the beginning in large units, and in
those branches of industry which started small - coal and tinplate, - there
was little London and Bristol mercantile capital. In iron, however, the
demands of war brought both merchants and their capital, Anthony Bacon to
Cyfarthfa Furnace at Methrhy Tydfil in 1765, joined subsequently by the London
merchants Richard Crawshay, Alexander Raby, Sir Benjamin Hammett, Henry Smithers,
Thompsons, Harfords, Grenfells. Johns regards the process as an exception
in 'British development. South Wales has raw materials or access to them,
- coal, iron, copper, tin, - but lacked an industrial tradition comparable
to that of the Midlands, Lancashire or Yorkshire. When war cut off Britain
from Russian and Swedish iron ore, an opportunity presented itself with few
local resources to take advantage of it. London and to a much lesser extent
Bristol merchants brought capital and entrepreneurship. The same opportunities
did not present themselves elsewhere [Johns, 1950, chapters 2,6].
In frequent other cases trade and industry were linked in the early 18th
century, but nothing came of it. At an early nonspecialized stage merchants
were involved in all kinds of manufacture. The firm of Sutton and Cotesworth
started out as tallow-chandlers and corn merchants in Newcastle, traded
internationally in grindstones, glass bottles, lead and salt among exports,
flax, hemp, madder, whalebone and wines among imports, manufactured candles
and sword steel, mined coal and grindstones, and produced salt [Hughes, 1952,
pp. 7, 51, 58, 59, 69]. Joseph Pease of Hull invested in trade, shipping,
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underwriting and whaling, founded a bank, but preferred to think of himself
as an industrialist, engaged in oil-seed crushing, white lead, whiting, soap
and paint-making, cotton spinning, and through his son-in-law distilling and
copper mining. Jackson calls him "one of the great entrepreneurs of the 18th
century" [1972, p. 101]. He can hardly have contributed to the industrial
revolution.
There were of course revolutionary figures in trade: Strutt who
financed Arkwright's patent for the roller spinner and subsequent patents
[Fotton and Wadsworth, 1958, pp. 63-64], Robert Owen, David Dale, Samuel
Oldknow but they came from the country draper's shops, not from the merchant
princes [Wadsworth and Mann, 1931, p. 239]. In Fortunes Made in Business
[anon. 1883] only three of 28 industrial fortunes resulted from production
of one who had started in trade. Sir John Brown was apprenticed to a cutlery
merchant, having wanted to be a merchant as a boy despite family resistance,
started to make his own cutlery, and gradually moved into other steel
products such as files, and ended up making railway spring buffers. Titus
Salt set himself up as a manufacturer to spin alpaca wool after trading in
it because he could not induce Bradford spinners to spin that fiber.
William Bass was a carrier of beer, then a trader, and finally a brewer.
But these connections run between the humblest of value-added merchants,
rather than the merchant bankers, and not at all between the gains-from—
trade merchant princes and industry. David Dale who built the New Lanark
cotton mills outside Glasgow was not one of the 140 pre-1776 Glasgow merchants
making fortunes in tobacco, but started as an apprentice in a silk mercer's
house, imported linen yarn, went then into banking and only then into
cotton spinning [Fox Bourne, 1866, p. 189].
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Trade thus grew with the industrial revolution, rather than starting it,
as Bairoch also demostrates [1973, passim ] . In fact, it is just as well that
merchants who do make great fortunes withdraw from trade. Gains-from-trade
merchants have to make a fortune in a few years because their rents are likely
to be competed away rapidly. Value-added merchants are usually capable of
making only a few major improvements in the organization of trade or a change
in product before they settle into a routine. To make a fortune and clear out
leaves the coast clear for new families to enter and adjust to evolving
conditions. Such new families may not exist, as noted earlier for Exeter.
If then the commercial revolution was the expansion of overseas trade in
colonial goods - sugar, tobacco, tea and coffee - the merchant's role was not
central to the industrial revolution. The value-added merchant aided industrial-
ization in two ways - by urging improvements and expanding the market, and
perhaps in a third way, in the usual case, by removing himself from the
economic process after a limited period, and unblocking what would otherwise
be a barrier to change. The process of building the market proceeds by
stages - first through a relay point like London, and a relay institution
like the merchant. As information becomes widespread and change slows
down, to maintain the old circuits is inefficient.
IV
French foreign trade expanded somewhat faster than that of the United
Kingdom during the 18th century, and trade of some ports - notably Bordeaux,
the real exports of which grew at a compound rate of 4.1 percent per year,
much faster. Fortunes were made not only in Bordeaux, but in Marseilles,
Nantes, St. Malo, Rouen, Le Havre among ports, and by the great merchants
- negociants - of inland cities Paris, Lyons, Amiens, Beauvais, Le Mans and
the like. Much of the trade of the ports, however, like that of Amsterdam,
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Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, was only loosely coupled with domestic production
in France and thus had little to do with the industrialization process.
Within France there was a commercial and equally an industrial evolution
- without the discontinuity one finds in the Britain of the last quarter of
the century. The negociants reaped large gains from trade and big fortunes.
Some went into banking. Many bought seigneuries (landed estates) and offices
available from the King including ennoblement. To a greater extent than in
Britain, ports were populated by foreign merchants, or Protestants of French
origin, usually nominally converted to Catholicism, whose loyalties ran
partly orwholly to fellow-religionists and family members abroad. The
internal market developed first through the relay of Paris, and a lesser
extent, Orleans and Lyons, which were finally overcome through direct ship-
ments. Annual and semi-annual fairs gave way in the century to continuous
distribution.
French economic historiography has given us a rich detailed picture of the
position of the separate ports, and of the textile trades of Beauvais and
Le Mans, based on archives and notarial records - Admiralty accounts, rolls
for special taxation, and individual marriage contracts, testaments, and
bankruptcy proceedings. The prosperity of the ports was due above all to
overseas trade. Trade of the Middle Ages in wheat, salt and wine gave away
after the middle of the 17th century, and especially in the last quarter,
to preoccupation with sugar and slaves, and to a lesser degree coffee,
cotton and indigo. Saint Malo and Nantes were deeply engaged in fishing
for cod off Newfoundland, which was dried or salted for distribution to the
Catholic peasantry of France, and as well, along with salt beef from Ireland,
to slaves in the Antilles. In the course of the 18th century, Bordeaux
prospered especially because of her window on the Atlantic and her good
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relations, based on the ancient trade in wine, with Holland and the Baltic
to which excess supplies of sugar, coffee and indigo were relayed.
Nantes (and its neighbor Lorient) had the privilege of the French
East India Company (until 1769) and was a center of trade in spices. Its
success, most marked in the first half of the century, was owing to its
accumulation of capital from the Indian trade, and its threeway trade in
slaves and sugar. Well placed for the movement of high-value products like
spices to the interior, its long-run disability lay in poor road and river
connections with Paris [Meyer, 1969, pp. 66, 252]. The salt, cod, sugar,
drugs and spices brought to Le Mans from Nantes had to be transhipped from
boat to horses and cart at Malicorne [Dornic, 1955, p. 103]. Bordeaux was
not much better situated. It could supply planters in Martinique and
Saint-Dominque with flour, wines, brandy and salted food, cod transhipped
from Brittany or beef from Ireland, but was far from manufacturing centers
of France. Crouzet claims this was not important since the biggest export
item was textiles and they were not heavy [Crouzet, 1968, p. 210]. Inward
shipments were handicapped by high transport costs, administrative and
customs obstacles, not to mention low incomes. They consisted of Spanish
wool, salt and dried fish, and above all sugar and coffee. Soap, dried
fruits, rice, drugs, perfumes and oils came by water from Marseilles [ Ibid .
,
p. 275]. Elsewhere Crouzet suggests that if trade is regarded as a superficial
phenomenon in France, so was it in the United Kingdom, and that Bordeaux,
Nantes and Rouen furnished the colonies the textiles to clothe the slaves,
materials for sugar mills, sails, cordage and cannon for ships [Crouzet,
1966, p. 265]. The list seems skimpy. Meyer produces a longer one for
Nantes, nearer to the manufacturing centers than Bordeaux, - luxury articles
wanted by the planters - (furniture, silver, books, clothes) - food for
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slaves: dried cod fron Newfoundland, salt beef and butter from Ireland and
Brittany; food for the planters: flour, grain, wine, brandy; construction
materials: bricks, lime, wood; cheap cloth for the slaves, etc. and calls
them of "mediocre" or "feeble" value [Meyer, 1969, pp. 164, 225]. It is
hard to accept Crouzet's contention that commercial expansion was a strategic
factor in the growth of industry, or that the international conjuncture
spread to the peasantry - whose economic life was rather dominated by the
state of the harvest well into the nineteenth century.
If overseas commerce did not help greatly with demand, there remains
the question of capital formation. Fortunes were made at Nantes and
Bordeaux in 10 to 15 years, Arthur Young said [quoted Meyer, 1969, p. 207].
Many of these were consumed in purchases of seigneuries and the building of
chateaux. Others found their way into banking. Some went abroad. Foreign
merchants never completely dominated the merchant communities of France, but
they frequently led them. Bordeaux was a melting pot, and at the top of
society the foreign merchants, living assembled at Chartrons and connected
through the "Protestant international" to Huguenots and other Protestants
not only at other French ports but at Amsterdam, London, Geneva [Poussou,
1968, p. 345; Crouzet, 1968, pp. 213-24]. Not all foreigners were Protestants;
among them were Irish and English Catholics, themselves religious and political
refugees as the Huguenots were from France. As the total number of negociants
recorded by Carriere in Marseilles rose from 275 at the beginning of the
18th century to 750 near the end on the eve of the French Revolution, the
proportion of foreigners went from 10 to 18 percent, and those of French
from the Languedoc and Dauphine, largely Protestants if nominal converts, from
9 to 28 percent [Carriere, 1973, p. 280], Some Huguenot capital was exported
from France following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and particularly
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in the waves of penalties against failure to abjure Protestantism begun 10
years before 1685 and lasting as late as 1730 [Scoville, 1960, chapter 2].
It was easy for merchants and shippers to export gold, silver, jewelry,
furniture. Van Harzel, a Dutch Protestant, who possessed the second largest
fortune in Nantes in 1715 - 400,000 livres - escaped in 1730 with his
entire wealth [Meyer, 1969, p. 173]. Contemporaries and later scholars made
a great deal of this loss, and of the dependence on Marseilles and even Nantes
merchants on Swiss funds of the "Protestant diaspora" [Dermigny, 1960, p. 209],
but this is denied [Carriere, 1973, 930ff], The Protestant infusion of the
negoce , however important, owes a great deal to the movement of Protestants
excluded from charges and offices and with inhospitable farmland off the
southern slopes of the Central Massif, to Bordeaux and Marseilles [Cavignac, 1967,
p. 30, Carriere, 1973, p. 279]. Foreigners took part when a port failed
to maintain representatives abroad - as Marseilles, not deeply engaged in
Northern trades, let Swiss, German, British, Dutch agents buy, rather than
itself sought to sell [Carriere, 1973, p. 274] or in some views filled a
vacuum left by French disdain for commerce [Mathorex, 1919, chapter II,
section 1]. Or it could possibly be regarded as a supply response with
excess German potential merchants, limited by the closed ranks of the
Hanseatic cities, and anxious to join the race for fortunes, finding a
place in French ports and even in the West Indian islands. Jean-Jacques
Bethmann (sic ) was the richest shipowner and one of the greatest merchants
in Bordeaux, of Frankfurt-am-Main origin, and there were many others [Cavignac,
1967, p. 30; Thesee, 1972, p. 10]. Spanish and Portuguese Jews expelled
from their countries were not numerous, but some of them were among the
most prominent. Abraham Gradis had many friends in high places, was owed
money by the Marshall of Richelieu and the Duke of Lorges , and died, some
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years after a loss of 2,7000,000 livres tournois with a fortune of 10,000,000,
second only to that at 15 millions in 1791 of the Languedocian, Francois
Bonaffe, a Protestant who married a Creole in Guadeloupe [Poussou, 1968,
pp. 349-50].
As in Britain, there are a few examples of close connection between
commerce and industry. The Dolle brothers, originally from the Dauphine,
made money in commerce with the Antilles, via the fair of Beaucaire, and
moved to buy plantations in the Islands, rather than land in France. In
1787 they explored the desirability of going into linen weaving in Grenoble
to assure a supply of cloth for their slaves [Le"on, 1963, p. 87]. This
conveys a hint of market failure, that adequate supplies would not be
available at appropriate times and prices when needed, although perhaps it
is nothing more than an outlet for surplus funds. More apposite, but also
more debated is the Huguenot ship-owner, Antoine-Jean Solier, who took
funds from his correligionists in the calico printing ( indiennes) trade,
whether in Switzerland to which they had been expelled by the Revocation
of the Edict of Nantes, or after their return to France in the Oberkampf
plant at Jouy [Dermigny, 1960, passim ] . Solier et Cie was a negociant
in general as well as a specialist in import of undyed calico from India,
and it is not certain that Swiss participation in this last trade was
more significant than any other.
One odd connection between trade and commerce led through land.
The merchant retired to the country on an estate, but then entered industry
as a maitre de forge on the basis of iron discovered on the property and woods
available for charcoal. Le Nicolais of Laval was a negociant blanchisseur
who acquired the forge of Aron in this way [Domic, 1955, p. 171]. Another
was Narcisse L. , associated with his father in the wine trade in Paris who,
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in 1833, took on interests in mines and blast furnaces [Daumard, 1970,
p. 368]. The equivalent in Glasgow was the tobacco merchant whose land
turned out, or was known in advance to bear coal, and led its owner into
the coal, salt or iron business [Price, 1973, p. 587; Hughes, 1952, chapter
ii].
Rouen and Le Havre were more closely connected with industry, and
Rouen more than Le Havre which participated in the colonial trade. Woolens
and linens of Northern France were sold at fairs at Caen and Guilbray
and shipped over Rouen when exported. More important was the growth of
the cotton-textile industry, based on cotton imported from the Islands,
and the putting-out system operated by Rouen merchants. "Siamoises", a
mixture of linen and cotton patterned after the dress worn by the ambassador
of Siam and the members of his suite in 1684, were one speciality. Total
production rose rapidly in Rouen and its parishes from 50,000 pieces in
1717 to 489,000 in 1767, and were exported as well as sold within France
[Dardel, 1966, p. 119]. As Britain mechanized, Rouen tried to follow suit,
with the aid of British workers, merchants and manufacturers. Fortunes
were perhaps made more quickly in the colonial trade either directly,
or via Cadiz, than by industry, and in banking, which was closely associated
with Paris. Rouen was more like Liverpool, Bordeaux like Glasgow, except
that Liverpool was associated with an innovative textile center, Rouen with
an imitative. It was badly hurt by the Eden treaty of 1786 which lowered
duties in English textiles and earthenware.
Apart from Rouen, the grand negoce of the ports had a limited connection
with the industrial evolution of France. The same was not true of the
great merchants of inland cities, insofar as they have been studied.
France is a hexagon, closed against the outside world, but connected in-
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ternally by a communication network. Until the 18th century, this operated
commercially with Paris as the entrepot, pivot, or relay. In the sixteenth
century the brightly colored cloths of Paris and Rouen were being sold
in the Languedoc by merchants travelling to fairs [Le Roy Ladurie, 1966,
pp. 123-26]. At the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century,
Paris began to be eliminated by direct selling. In 1650, Beauvais sold
its linens two thirds to Paris and Lyons, with the rest local or exported
over Rouen. In 1690 exports had gained at the expense of Paris, and direct
relations had been established by Beauvais merchants with Montpellier,
Toulouse and other inland cities. By 1730, the role of Paris had shrunk
to very small proportions. Lyons sustained its trade. In the early period
it had been a relay point for the south. Later it served as a stapling
place for exports to Switzerland and Italy [Goubert, 1959, maps, pp. 29,
71, 103]. Over the eighty years and throughout the rest of the 18th century
exports grew to a preponderant position because of the competition at home
from cotton cloths. The high quality demi-Hollandes of the seventeenth
century became an export staple because of the loss of home demand. By
diverting the existing supply to new outlets, the Danse, Motte and other
mercantile dynasties relieved the pressure on Beauvais manufacturers to
keep up with technological change, and thus contributed indirectly to their
fossilization and ultimate decline.
Paris remained the relay longer for the newer goods in greater demand.
While Oberkampf at Jouy (after 1759) sold no indiennes in export markets,
it used Paris as a center of consumption and for redistribution to distant
points. Alongside this network, however, there developed marketing directly
through the established textile centers: Abbeville, Amiens, Beauvais,
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Troyes, etc. and the establishment of depositories who handled shipments
to fairs [Bergeron, 1973, p. 19]. There was of course specialization.
One Parisian indienneur, Dubois, sold 4/5th of his output in the provinces;
another, Jarry, mostly in Paris [ Ibid . ] . In silk, another high-grade
product, as well as in printed cottons, Lyons sold through Paris throughout
the century, apart from export sales. Two thirds of domestic sales went
through the relay of Paris, rather than directly and the "overpowering
superiority of Paris limited the direct intervention of Lyon negociants in
the rest of the country" [Garden, 1973, p. 20]. Even in silk, however,
Paris was a rival but did not dominate [ Ibid , p. 24].
There were some interesting features in the trade in etamines , a
loosely woven light woolen cloth in which Le Mans and the surrounding
cities specialized. The numbers of negociants in Le Mans engaged in this
product was seven in 1712, a dozen toward the middle of the century [Dornic,
1955, pp. 45, 59]. It is stated that these negociants followed the extension
of the master manufacturers "or at least did not precede it", but became
the masters of the trade by buying, finishing and shipping the cloth [ Ibid .
,
p. 53] . Le Mans and its surrounding towns specialized in etamines dyed
black, which was sold in large quantities to monks and nuns within France
and to Italy as well. Domestic sales through fairs were handled largely
by merchants from Paris or other towns, rather than by the marchand/drapier
mercier of Le Mans who existed in large numbers or the Le Mans ndgociants
[ Ibid . , pp. 1, 43, 100, 105]. Like demi-hollandes etamines lost out to
cotton textiles, and also suffered from the deterioration in the quality
of wool, Paris merchants dropped out of the trade, leaving the great
merchants of Le Mans only with overseas trade.
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The account of textiles in Maine provides a footnote on Paris as a
relay in the "curious commercial circuit" in linens. The Abbey of Le
Beauvais in Le Mans bought linen for shirts, underpants and stockings
from Alencon, 30 kilometers to the north and slightly west each year from
1713 to 1730. These were delivered at the end of January or beginning
of February, like other linens bought from Rouen for surplices, table
linen and handkerchiefs, by a certain Marigner, wholesale cloth merchant
of Paris, 100 kilometers to the east of Le Mans [Domic, 1955, p. 109].
Dornic suggests that the explanation lies in the state of the local roads
in winter. Another possibility is that until direct selling took over
especially in the declining products which lost out in the French luxury
market, the relay of Paris remained critical. In foodstuffs, of course,
it continued at Les Halles in Paris until the market was moved to Orly
in the 1960s.
By the middle of the 18th century, Paris like London and Amsterdam
was shifting from trade to finance. It continued to invest in trade,
through the trade of the ports. One scholar states bluntly that Paris in
the 18th century was a financial not a commercial city [Cavignac, 1967,
p. 132], but this presumably would apply more fully to the second than
to the first half of the century. But the funds were invested but little in
industry. Le couteulx, Paris banker and Rouen merchant, invested in textile
manufactures in Rouen, but mainly trafficked in Spanish piastres through
his Cadiz branch [ Ibid . ] . Paris was a relay for money which went back
to the ports and to foreign trade, when it was not used to buy privileges
from the court, rather than into industry. At the same time, the commercial
network within France, if not the superficial but profitable trade of the
ports, evolved side by side with the progress in production.
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V
Germany has been characterized as an economy without highly developed
commerce, and one which sprang directly from traditional society to in-
dustrialization without passing through an extended commercial development
[Borchardt, 1971, pp. 89-90, 145-46; Kocka, 1974, p. 9]. In the early 19th
century, a British observer characterized Mttnster as having "little
commerce", claimed that the "commerce of Hanover (is) inconsiderable
despite the connection of Bremen" and further that:
"A body of merchants and manufacturers, who by their capital
give employment to numerous workmen, and who like country gentlemen
are too rich to be dependent on the smiles or frowns of the
court, is not to be found in Prussia [Jacobs, 1820, pp. 94,
116, 225]
Bavaria was marked by a lack of a considerable group of great merchant
families and great distant trading houses [Schremmer, 1970, p. 594]. In
Baden, merchants were mistrusted as swindlers and speculators and the task
of industrial development (Gewerbefoerderung) was to protect and strengthen
the middle class against them [Fischer, 1962, p. 79].
This picture is perhaps one-sided, leaving out as it does the Hanseatic
cities - Cologne, Bremen, Hamburg, Lttbeck, the Rhineland and Frankfort-am-
Main, in which merchant communities were highly developed. Cologne had
sunk back from a leading position in international commerce as Antwerp
and Rotterdam proved better located for stapling. In its turn, Ldbeck,
the site of Thomas Mann's novel of a merchant dynasty, Buddenbrooks [1901],
lost out to the better-located Hamburg and Bremen. These cities, however,
developed their own merchant dynasties, with Hamburg especially strengthened
by displaced Huguenots in the early 17th century and by refugees from the
French Terror at the end. Hamburg specialized in short-haul trade to the
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Baltic and above all London. It became known as the "English city".
Bremen developed long-distance traffic, especially trans-atlantic, in
tobacco, cotton and rice. Hamburg dominated in sugar, coffee, hides,
tropical wood and wines. Bremen complained that it lacked an export
product, as Hamburg had grain and the Baltic ports grain and wood [Rauers,
1913, pp. 13-15]. Frankfurt was the gateway for British goods to southern
German states.
Frankfurt and Hamburg differed profoundly in social and political
ways. Frankfurt was a creation of the Prussian emperor, who established
the Frankfurt fair there, at the major crossing on the east-west trade
route of central Europe. When the Zollverein was formed under Prussian
leadership, Frankfurt found membership irresistible. Hamburg was republican,
oligarchic, devoted to trade, shipping and finance to the exclusion of all
else. The leading merchants associated but little with bureaucrats from
government, refused to accept titles, and frowned on intermarriage with
Prussian officers [Eckardt, 1910, I, p. 200]. In contrast to Augsburg
whose merchants were anxious to be ennobled, the city not only forbade
ennoblement as a strict rule as early as 1276, a regulation renewed in 1658
and practiced throughout the 17th century, but stated on the earliest of
these occasions that no knight could live in the city [Schramm, 1969,
p. 82]. Hamburg was a miniature Holland, populated by gains-from-trade
merchants stapling commodities produced for the most part at a distance.
It resisted incorporation in the Zollverein and the Reich, until the
patriotic surge of 1870, and even then it remained a free port, rather than
an integral economic member of the Empire, for another decade and a half.
Within Frankfurt, moreover, there was a difference of view between the
patrician merchants who wanted to stay out of Zollverein, and the new group
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who succeeded in winning adherence [Bohme, 1968, passim ] . The difference
corresponds roughly to the gains-from-trade leading merchants, interested
in overseas trade and especially British goods, and value-added men con-
cerned with developing the local market.
Limited economic development in most of the German states, and
especially poor transport connections among them, and political separation,
led to stunted commercial growth outside the Hanseatic states, Frankfurt
and the Rhineland. The Rhineland and Westphalia were different from
the other German states even before guild restrictions were eliminated
by Napoleon at the end of the century. Merchant networks large and small
were much more fully developed. Barmen and Elberfeld concentrated in
textiles, and especially bleaching and dyeing, with the former emphasizing
production, the latter marketing. What is impressive about Barmen and
Elberfeld is their capacity to shift as comparative advantage was lost -
from linens to cottons and then to ribbons and embroidery. When high
wages and English competition with machine cottons made it necessary, a
plant was moved across the river to Gladback-Rheydt . By the end of the
18th century, the mercantile elite with customers throughout Europe, and
especially France, the Netherlands and London, was a close-knit oligarchy,
cut off from the aristocracy as the English and French were not , and turned
inward into a life of luxury - horses, servants, finishing schools for
daughters, wine, jewelry and speaking French. Of the 300 mercantile houses
in Frankfurt, 240 were of German origin and in 1776 some 50 to 60 of them
were from Barmen and Elberfeld [Kisch, 1972, pp. 347, 363, 383, 387].
Similar mercantile towns existed in the Krefeld and Munster, not to mention
Cologne.
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Silesia was otherwise. The linen trade flourished from the 16th
century only when Dutch and English merchants by-passed the guilds because
they could not adjust to the requirements of foreign markets [Kisch, 1959,
p. 543]. By the late 17th, early 18th century Silesian linen dominated
the world, and produced a class of wealthy merchants, who loaned out their
profits in mortgages of the aristocracy and, when they could, acquired
estates [ Ibid . , p. 552]. When linen lost its overseas market to cotton,
the only response was lower wages and fraud and adulteration [Blumberg,
1960a, p. 99].
The merchant class in the Rhineland seems to have furnished entrepreneurs
for industry, but the petty merchant class rather than the GrosskaufmMnner .
A study of Rhenish and Westphalian entrepreneurs notes that many of them
in the 19th century came from merchant families of the previous century
[Zunkel, 1962, chapter 1]. The author comments that whereas in Britain
entrepreneurs came largely from artisans, in Germany merchants played at
least an equal role [ Ibid . , p. 25]. These small merchants, KaufmMnner
rather than Grosskaufmanner of the sort found in Hamburg, went from putting
out into manufacturing, like J.G. Brugelmann who built the first mechanical
cotton-spinning works at Ratingen near DUsseldorf in 1783, five stories
high, with 1600 spindles, and partly but not entirely waterpowered [Adelmann,
1970, p. 86]. Until 1830-50, foreign trade and financing of foreign trade
were largely in Dutch hands. Krupp, Stinnes, Haniel, Liebrecht, Ehrenbold
also moved from trade to production in iron and coal in the first half of
the 19th century [Wutzmer, 1960, pp. 148-50]. Mannesmann at Remscheid
was a printer and merchant who started a file factory in competition with
British imports [Zunkel, 1962, p. 26]. "It was not the successful handworker
who made it big, but his son, who, converted from being a powerfully capitalized
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merchant, used the corporate form, and hired a technical man who remained
in the second rank" [Aycoberry, 1968, p. 518]. On the other hand, in
Switzerland in the textile industry, factory pioneers were technical people,
not financial, trade or managerial [Braun, 1965, p. 78]. Elsewhere, however,
Braun noted that the north of the Alps there formed a local stationary
class of merchants united in guilds parallel to the handwork guilds of
the city, who were interested in innovation, achievement-oriented, and busy
not only in trade, traffic and finance but also in production. He cites
the Geneva watch industry along with the Zurich textile industry, as linked
to city merchants, who, once the restrictions of the ancient regime were
lifted, put forth a tremendous burst of energy [ Ibid . , pp. 263-64].
There is some slight evidence of merchants investing in industry.
A table of professions of the founders (original stockholders) of 61
companies in Prussia in the 1850s, covering 480 individuals, showed 32
percent merchants, 14 percent manufacturers, 12 percent state officials, 11
percent bankers, 7 percent large landowners and 1.3 percent military.
The representation of merchants in mining in Silesia was lower than for
Prussia as a whole, dominated by the Rhineland [Blumberg, 1960b, p. 196].
In one Cologne cotton spinning and weaving plant, 29 merchants, 8 bankers,
2 manufacturers, one mine-owner, one newspaper published and 2 state officials
were investors; and in a Silesian mine, 3 mine-owners, 13 merchants, 13
mine officials, 22 independent artisans and tradesmen, 8 officials, 4
millowners, 2 teachers, 2 doctors, 2 innkeepers, 1 "investor", 1 printshop
owner and eight other persons [ Ibid . , p. 201]. The Stinnes coal and iron
complex in 1850 had 41 living stockholders in Cologne consisting of 14
merchants, 7 bankers, 7 rentiers, 1 mine-owner, and one each of the occupa-
tions of director, building inspector, major general, chief accountant,
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judge, privy councillor, inspector, lawyer, doctor, lady, widow [Zunkel,
1962, p. 52]. The evidence is available only for the period after our
primary interest, and is highly fragmentary. It suggests, however, that
merchant wealth provided one of the major sources of company capital. It
is assumed that these were the value-added type of merchant rather than
gains-from-trade overseas traders.
The explanation given for underpresentation of merchants in Germany
as contrasted with Britain and France has various elements: first,
the late unification of the country and the failure at an early stage to
build an entrepot or relay pivot apart from the fairs of Frankfurt and
Leipsig; second, the disdain with which German social values regarded
commercial pursuits, holding the merchant in lower status than the indus-
trialist, in contrast with Britain where the opposite ranking obtained;
and third, the early bureaucratization of the firm, with direct buying
and selling combined with production in a single business entity.
The low standing of commerce in Germany (outside the Hanseatic cities
and Frankfurt-am-Main) contrasted with the higher status of the nobility
and the military of course, and of industry as well. Merchants were scorned
as tradespeople, Handler as opposed to heros, in Sombart's book Helden und
Handler , contrasting the Germans and the British. The term contained anti-
Semitic prejudice as well as a sense of economic and social inferiority
vis-a-vis the British [Kehr, 1965, p. 153]. The three-generations-from-
shirtsleeves-to-shirtsleeves did not apply in Germany nor was there opportunity
to gain acceptance in an open aristocracy [Zunkel, 1962, p. 13]. Purchase
of land in Prussia was forbidden to all but the nobility until 1807 [Ucke,
1888, pp. 8, 11] although there was brisk trade in land along the coastal
lands such as Mecklenburg and Holstein. After 1807 there is evidence of
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rich merchants buying estates [Kisch, 1959, p. 552] and farms which had
been in the same family for two or three hundred years changing hands
three, four or six times in ten to fifteen years [Abel, 1962, p. 304].
Sartorius von Waltershausen is quoted to the effect that in the 1820-1830
agricultural crisis 80 percent of aristocratic landlords lost their estates
[Bramsted, 1964, p. 54], and presumably not all were broken up and sold
off piecemeal to land-hungry peasants. Later estates were purchased.
But the rule broadly held: while bourgeois were permitted to purchase
estates after the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, and aristocrats to enter trade,
for the most part the old barriers to social integration held.
Industrialization on a significant scale in Germany came in the
middle of the 19th century, and relied on direct buying and selling rather
than a commercial network built up by value-added merchants. There is
some debate as to when German industrial "take-off" occurred [Hardach,
1972, pp. 67ff] but for our purposes the difference of 20 years is inconsequen-
tial. In mining, distribution of coal was regulated by the state, subject
to price control, and did not need to rely on a mercantile structure
[Jankowski, 1973, pp. 718ff]. Railroads were large-scale and so quickly
were iron and steel producers. In the earliest stages of getting started,
when the firm consisted of 35 workers, Albert Poensgen, of the steel tubing
plant of Poensgen & Schoeller, took over all mercantile activities of the
firm personally, especially supervising the routine purchasing of inputs
by two employees after Dutch merchants failed to perform what he had expected
from them [Hatzfeld, 1966, p. 204].
In the electrical and chemical new industries, bureaucratic organization
took place from the beginning. Siemens and Halske was started by a military
engineer, Werner Siemens, and quickly acquired a manager in another military
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man, Wilhelm Meyer. Initial sales were of telegraphic installations for
the military forces of Prussia, and the Russian government. By 1872,
Werner Siemens noted the necessity to write to customers in advance of
undertaking production. "Only thus can our fabrication constructions
be very cheap, good, and quickly delivered" [Kocka, 1969, p. 126]. The
middleman was eliminated before he had taken hold in an effort to speed
up technical progress. Kocka observes that the monopoly on education which
the merchant class had had earlier was eroded by general universal education,
and that rather than rely on a mercantile network, large companies enforced
standardization, undertook communication of goods and prices, delivered
goods to inventories of shops, sold by sending samples over distances,
undertook direct contact between buyer and seller [Ibid., p. 165]. Dye
companies initially marketed abroad through export firms in the developing
countries, and through wholesale firms in Europe and the United States.
These agents were allowed, however to carry only one firm's lines. After
1885, they went to direct selling [Beer, 1959, p. 95]. The chemical industry
requires intimate contact between producer and consumer to ensure proper
use of frequently dangerous materials, but in any case products which must
be employed in exact ways to achieve efficient results [Hohenburg, 1967,
pp. 127ff].
Did the absence of a well-knit system of markets hurt? Political
reality more than the absence of mercantile connections was responsible
for the fact that prior to Zollverein and the railroad, Germany was not
one country but a juxtaposition of a number of half-closed economies.
With Zollverein and the railroad, a large German market quickly substituted
for innumerable local markets [Benaerts, 1933, pp. 121-22]. It has frequently
been claimed that Germany was poor in capital prior to 1980. Sombart observed
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that great fortunes were rare, and the man with a mere half-million talers
regarded as rich [Ibid., p. 123]. Hamburg at mid-century is said to have
had 100 millionaires in mark banco (equivalent to 500,000 talers) as opposed
to only seven or eight in Cologne [Aycoberry, 1968, p. 515]. But as
Borchardt has made clear in a classic article, it is hard to give content
to the widely held view that German's lag behind Britain in the early 19th
century was the result of lack of capital. Capital markets, like goods
markets were fragmented and underdeveloped, but banking institutions (and
foreign credits) responded quickly to the demand for capital for such
large projects as railroads and iron foundries, and once started, they
proceeded on reinvested profits [Borchardt, 1961, passim ] . The so-called
German way to industrialization may have been delayed by the absence of
an antecedent capital market built on mercantile credit but not for long.
VI
No attempt has been made to compare numbers of merchants at various
periods in Holland, Britain, France or Germany, or to evaluate such state-
ments as that England in 1721 had 2/3rds the numbers of merchants of all
Europe put together, though Amsterdam in 1671 handled 10 times as much
trade as London with l/20th the retailers [Westerf ield, 1915, p. 412].
The secondary sources are weak on the merchant communities of London and
Paris because of their great size and complexity, and because of the destruc-
tion of the Paris archives in 1871 [Daumard, 1970, p. 8] . A few qualitative
conclusions can perhaps be drawn, however.
The widely-held view of contribution of the merchant to industrialization
seems clearly exaggerated insofar as the profits of "gains-from-trade"
commerce are concerned. These fortunes are neither necessary nor sufficient
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to stimulate industry. They are typically consumed, invested in nonindustrial
outlets, including banks which finance primarily trade or foreign govern-
ments, and in land, government stock, annuities, offices . When industry
catches hold, it largely uses trade credit, finances itself with plowed
back profits. In large-scale industry - South Wales iron and German
joint-stock companies - one can find investor contributions from merchants
and especially in the latter case banks. They are the exception.
Nor do merchants typically become manufacturing entrepreneurs, unless
one limits the discussion to the putters-out of the proto-industrialization
period. Again there are exceptions like Benjamin Gott among the "value-
added" merchants. The great majority of merchants who made fortunes
moved out of business into banking, politics or rural pursuits. Where there
was no aristocracy to ape - perhaps because the agriculture of the area
did not produce a surplus which needed to be guarded, or which could be
expropriated by the landed aristocracy and military - merchant oligarchies
formed, tended to dig in, and ultimately lead to mercantile decay. The
moving off successful merchants served the economic function of removing
what might otherwise have developed into a block to change.
The value-added merchant is an unit in an information network. In
the early stages, information is needed to see what can be produced and
what is needed or sought, and where. Surveillance of quality and delivery
timeliness is one aspect of information control. Division of labor between
producer and his intelligence-gathering collaborator permits maximum
efficiency.
With success comes fossilization, at which stage the merchant network
is a barrier to change, with the result that it is helpful to have him
ready to retire. Where he clings to the old ways, decay ensues.
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One general force reducing the role of the merchant was universal
education. The rents earned by both types of merchants were initially
based on his monopoly of calculation and languages. Apprenticeship was
expensive and consisted in instruction at home and in the offices of
associates abroad. Money and opportunity costs limited entry. But the
spread of education competed down the rents of merchants. With information
cheap, direct connections rendered the middleman obsolete when he was not
dys funct ional
.
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